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Abstract
In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth
model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with rival but non-excludable
public good which is ¯nanced by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspector.
We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic
framework, is not unique, but is di®erent depending on the relevance of the shame e®ect.
We show that growth rates - both of income and of tax revenues - decrease, as the tax rate
increases, for all types of shame e®ect countries but they di®er in how the growth rate
decreases as the tax rate increases: the rate of decrease is higher in low shame countries
than in high shame countries.
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Tax evasion and scal corruption have been a general and persistent problem throughout
history with serious economic consequences, not only in transition economies, but also in
countries with developed tax systems. In general, tax evasion and corruption can have
ambiguous eects on economic growth: tax evasion increases the amount of resources
accumulated by entrepreneurs, but it also reduces the amount of public services supplied
by the government, thus leading to negative consequences for economic growth. Although
there is extensive literature investigating the origins, eects and extent of tax evasion and
corruption, from both theoretical and empirical points of view, interaction between them
has only been partially explored: only recently has this relationship been investigated in the
literature. The analysis of tax evasion in the tax compliance literature dates back at least to
the classic paper of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Since then, a large amount of literature
relating to corruption and tax evasion has emerged. In particular, only recently can we nd
theoretical models which study tax setting and evasion in a context of growth models (e.g.
Lin and Yang (2001), Chen (2003) and Ellis and Fender (2006)).
Lin and Yang (2001) extended the portfolio choice model of tax evasion from a static to a
dynamic setting, nding that, while growth is decreasing with respect to tax rate in absence
of evasion, it is U{shaped with respect to tax rate in presence of tax evasion. In contrast
to our model, in their work, the public goods are not productive, then diverting resources
from the non{productive public sector to the productive private sector, scal evasion will be
conductive to economic growth.
Chen (2003) integrates tax evasion into an AK model with public capital nanced by
income tax which can be evaded. In his model, individuals optimize tax evasion, while the
government optimizes the tax rate, auditing and ne rate, given the evasion level decided by
consumers. In general, these policies have ambiguous eects, but for some parameters the
author nds that the growth rate decreases as tax evasion increases.
Ellis and Fender (2006) introduce endogenous corruption into a variant of the Ramsey growth
model where a government taxes private producers and uses the resources to either supply
public capital or simply consumes the taxes itself (corruption form).
In contrast to these papers, we deal not with bureaucratic but with scal corruption which
establishes a direct impact of evasion/corruption on tax revenues, and thus on economic
growth.
In our model, we develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with rival but non{excludable
public good which is nanced by a percentage of taxes. In line with Chander and Wilde
(1992), Hindricks, Keen and Muthoo (1999) and Sanyal, Gang and Goswami (2000), we also
assume that tax auditing may be performed by a corruptible tax inspector, who takes a bribe
in exchange for not reporting the detected evasion. Thus, in our model, evasion goes hand
in hand with the corruption of the tax inspector. In particular, we analyze the implications
of endogenous evasion and corruption at a micro level and then we use the results of our
static game as a framework for the growth model. In fact, taxation and tax evasion, in turn,
inuence both the provision of the public good and capital accumulation, aecting output
and economic growth in a dierent way: on one hand, higher tax evasion implies more capital
accumulation and thus more economic growth; on the other hand, higher tax evasion leads
to lower tax revenues, less provision of public good and thus, a lower economic growth rate.
1In contrast with some lines of research on tax evasion, we do not consider the issue of optimal
remuneration of tax inspectors by assuming that the inspector is paid a xed wage1.
We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection is not unique but is
dierent depending on the relevance of the \shame eect" and depending on the static or
dynamic context of the analysis.
Our work is part of one of two lines of research of taken by literature on tax evasion (Feld
and Frey, 2007), i.e. the line of research which considers tax morale as the key factor to
explain the fact that, contrary to the results of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), \people who
exhibit empirically observed levels of risk aversion normally pay their taxes, although there
is a low probability of getting caught and being penalized" (Frey and Torgler, 2007). In
particular, we consider a growth model where the aggregate tax evasion is determined by
non{pecuniary costs which depend upon the entrepreneurs' attitude to social stigma2. In
fact, like Dell'Anno (2009), we analyze a dynamic model, where the aggregate tax evasion is
microfounded on non{pecuniary costs.
Several empirical studies highlight the importance of non-economic factors on tax evasion.
For example Alm and Torgler (2006) nd that the tax morale can explain more than 20
percent of the total variance of the variable size of the shadow economy (used as a measure
of tax evasion): thus, if tax morale is declining, the shadow economy is likely to increase.
Richardson's work (2006) shows, in an empirical analysis based on data for 45 countries,
that non{economic determinants have the strongest impact on tax evasion: in particular,
tax morale is an important determinant of tax evasion.
Unlike Dell'Anno (2009), but following the line taken by Kim (2003), we assume that people
may fear social stigma (shame eect) only if they are detected as cheaters/corrupted. In this
paper, we have extended the static analysis of Cerqueti and Coppier (2009), in a long run
context incorporating the presence of a public sector. Indeed, in the short-run, it is a plausible
assumption that governments can be completely opportunistic, that is, they provide nothing
for the citizenry, not even national defense. But, in the long run, even taxpayers who are
initially ashamed of cheating will eventually change their minds and become less ashamed.
It is doubtful that the citizenry will have a strong sense of loyalty to an opportunistic
government, especially one that oers no productive output to its citizens. Following Barro
and Sala-I-Martin (1992), we incorporate a public good into a growth model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we rst present the model and then we
formalize and solve the game, describing the model in a static framework. In Section 3 we
extend the analysis in a dynamic context, endogenizing output and we go on to analyze
the relationship between the tax rate, dynamic tax revenues and income growth rate. We
conclude in Section 4.
1For example Besley and McLaren (1993), Hindriks et al. (1999) and Mookherjee and Png (1995), deal
with the issue of optimal remuneration of inspectors. Besley and McLaren (1993) compare three distinct
remuneration schemes which provide dierent incentives to the inspectors: eciency wages, reservation wages
and capitulation wages. Hindriks et al. (1999) consider a model where all the actors are dishonest. Mookherjee
and Png (1995) also consider only corruptible agents, but they remove the exogenous matching of the auditor
and the evader: they consider it a moral hazard problem, since, for evasion to be disclosed, the inspector has
to exert a costly non{observable eort.
2For a complete review of the main hypothesis proposed in literature on the dierent types of non{pecuniary
costs that inuence tax morale see Dell'Anno (2009).
22 The model
In line with Cerqueti and Coppier (2009), we consider an economy which produces a single
homogeneous good, with quantity y 2 [0;+1). There are three players in the economy:
controllers, tax inspectors and entrepreneurs. We consider that the private good is produced
by using two production factors, capital k and the public good with quantity G 2 [0;+1).
The provision of the public good allows us to have a rationale for the existence of a
government which uses tax revenues to nance the public good. Following Barro and Sala-
I-Martin (1992), we consider a rival but non{excludable public good G in order to take the
problem of congestion of the public good into account. In this case, the public good available
to an individual entrepreneur is the ratio of total public purchases G to the aggregate private
capital. Like Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), we dene the number of entrepreneurs as n, K
is the aggregate capital of entrepreneurs, A is the productivity parameter summarizing the
level of technology and G is the public good. Entrepreneurs use their available per capita
quantity of capital k 2 [0;+1) in the production sector. Following Lin and Yang (2001),
the capital per person k is xed and is equal for each entrepreneur, in a static setting. For
simplicity, we assume that capital does not depreciate. Then, the production function of
the good only depends on the capital, public good and the natural state which may occur:
we consider  2 (0;1) and  2 (0;1) such that production will be y = Ak(G=K)
 with a
probability (1 ), while with a probability  an adverse natural state will occur, production
will not take place and the corresponding production will be y = 0. By denition, we can
write K = n  k, and the production function in the good natural state can be rewritten as
y = An k1 G. Tax inspectors cannot invest in the production activity and earn a xed
salary w 2 [0;+1). Following Barro (1990), we assume that the public good is nanced
contemporaneously by a percentage  of tax revenues E 2 [0;+1)3. The tax inspector,
who checks whether tax payment is correct, is able to tell which of the two natural states
have occurred for each entrepreneur. It is common knowledge that the tax inspector4 is
corruptible, in the sense that s/he pursues her/his own interest and not necessarily that of
the State; in other words, the tax inspector is open to bribery. The tax inspector, in the
case of the \good" natural state and in exchange for a bribe b 2 [0;+1), can oer the
entrepreneur the opportunity of reporting that the \bad" natural state has arisen. In this
case, the entrepreneur could refuse to pay the bribe or agree to pay the bribe and negotiate the
amount with the inspector. The State monitors entrepreneurs' and tax inspectors' behavior
through controllers, in order to weed out or reduce corruption and xes the level of the
tax rate t 2 [0;1] on the product y. Let q 2 [0;1] be the exogenous monitoring level
implemented by the State; then q is the probability of being detected, given that corruption
has taken place. Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), we assume that the entrepreneurs
incur a punishment rate c 2 [0;1] on unreported income5. In addition we consider that the
3Conversely, Blackburn et. al. (2006) assume that the public good is provided as a xed proportion of
output, while revenues consist of the tax collected by the bureaucrat from high{income households, plus any
nes imposed on the bureaucrat detected in a corrupt transaction.
4We assume that an entrepreneur is seen by only one inspector and cannot turn to other inspectors to be
treated dierently.
5Conversely, Yitzhaki (1974) rst consider the penalty as a proportion of the amount of evaded taxes,
Caball e and Panad es (2007) show that when penalties are imposed proportionally to the amount of evaded
taxes, the rate of capital accumulation cannot increase with the tax rate, while if the penalties are imposed
3entrepreneurs are not homogeneous agents, and to be more precise, the j-th entrepreneur
attributes a subjective value cj to the objective punishment { depending on her/his own
\shame eect" { when the corrupt transaction is detected6. The entrepreneur, if detected,
must pay taxes ty, her/his \shame cost", but s/he is refunded the cost of the bribe paid to
the tax inspector7.
2.1 The game: description and solution
Given the new assumptions, the Cerqueti and Coppier (2009) game becomes the following
two-period game. In what follows, we refer to the entrepreneur payo by a superscript (1)
and to the inspector payo by a superscript (2): they represent respectively the rst and the




i ); i = 1;2.
(1) At stage one, the tax inspector checks the entrepreneurs' production. If a \bad"
natural state occurs, then the tax inspector reports that no tax is owed and in this
case, the game ends. Otherwise, if there is a \good" natural state, the tax inspector
may ask for the bribe bd and report that the \bad" natural state has arisen and that
the entrepreneur need not pay any tax.
(1:1) If bd = 0 no bribe is asked for, the game ends without corruption and with the
following payo vector:
(1) 1 = (An Gk1 (1   t);w):
(1:2) Otherwise, let bd > 0 be the positive bribe asked for by the tax inspector and the
game continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two, the entrepreneur decides whether to negotiate the bribe or not.
(2:1) If the entrepreneur refuses the bribe, then the payo vector is given by 1 dened
as in (1). Then in this case, the game ends. There is no penalty for the tax
inspector.
(2:2) If the entrepreneur decides to agree to pay the bribe, the negotiation starts and
the two parties will negotiate the bribe. In this case, the payos will depend on
whether the inspector and the entrepreneur are detected (with probability q) or
not detected (with probability (1  q)). There is no penalty for the tax inspector
who is detected8. In this case, the game ends with corruption and evasion and
the expected payo vector is given by:
(2) 2 =
 
An Gk1 (1   qt   cjq)   (1   q)b;w + (1   q)b

on the amount of unreported income, the amount of income concealed increases with the tax rate.
6In fact, as Alm and Torgler (2006) said, if taxpayers values are inuenced by cultural factors, then tax
morale may be an important determinant of taxpayer compliance and other forms of behavior.
7This assumption can be more easily understood when, rather than corruption, there is extortion by the
tax inspector, even though, in many countries, the relevant provisions or laws stipulate that the bribe shall, in
any case, be returned to the entrepreneur, and that combined minor punishment, (penal and/or pecuniary),
be inicted to her/him.
8The results do not depend on the existence of a cost for the tax inspector who is corrupt and detected.
4We rst determine the equilibrium bribe bNB9.
Proposition 2.1. Let q 6= 1. Then there exists a unique non negative bribe (bNB), as the
Nash solution to a bargaining game, given by:









where   "
"+ is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector and  and " are the
parameters which can be interpreted as the bargaining strength measures of the entrepreneur
and the tax inspector respectively.
We assume that the tax inspector and the entrepreneur share the surplus on an equal basis,












In other words, the bribe represents 50 percent of the saving which comes from not paying
taxes, net of the entrepreneur's \shame cost", if s/he is found out.
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By solving the static game, we can prove the following proposition:10
Proposition 2.2. Let 0 
t(1 q)
q = c  1. Then,
(a) if cj 2 [0;c) the j-th entrepreneur will nd it worthwhile to be corrupt and then the
game ends with the payo vector 4;
(b) if cj 2 [c;1] the j-th entrepreneur will nd it worthwhile to be honest and then the
game ends with the payo vector 2.
The threshold c can be interpreted as an honesty threshold.
This assumption about c in Proposition 3.1 holds true when we assume the existence of a





Thus, the honesty threshold c is well dened when q  q, e.g. the monitoring level is great
enough. We will suppose q  q in the remaining part of the paper.
Tax revenues depend on the hypothesis made about the distribution of the \shame cost":
if the specic j-th \shame cost" is lower than c, the entrepreneur nds it worthwhile to
evade all taxes; vice versa, if the j-th entrepreneur's \shame cost" is greater than c, then
9See Appendix A for the proof.
10See Appendix B for the proof.
5the entrepreneur will be honest.
The cumulative probability density denes the distribution of individual costs F(cj), where
j is the specic entrepreneur. The fraction of corrupted entrepreneurs, i.e. with a \shame
cost" cj  c, is given by F(c); analogously, the fraction of honest entrepreneurs, with a
\shame cost" cj > c, is given by 1   F(c).
On an aggregate level, the tax revenues, with a tax rate xed at t, will be equal to the tax
paid by those who nd themselves in a positive natural state (with probability (1   )) and
who have a \shame cost" which leads them to be honest, and those who are corrupt, but are
discovered in the act of corruption:
(7) E(t;q) = An Gk1 tF(c)(1   )q + An Gk1 t(1   F(c))(1   ):
We assume that the amount of public good G is a proportion  2 (0;1) of tax revenues, thus
E(t;q) = G. The shape of the function F gives good information about the general level
of entrepreneurs honesty. We analyze three cases, in order to describe three dierent types
of entrepreneur behavior.
 F symmetric and uniform: \uniform shame" countries.
In this case, the entrepreneurs are assumed to be uniformly distributed between
the honest and the corrupt. The sense of shame varies accordingly to an uniform
distribution, i.e.
(8) F(c) = c; 8c 2 [0;1]:
By substituting c with its expression in (7), a straightforward computation allows us
to rewrite E(t;q) as follows:
(9) E(t;q) = (1   )An G
Uk1 t

















 F asymmetric to the left: \low shame" countries.
The number of corrupt entrepreneurs is assumed to be greater than that of the
honest. From the probability distributions with support in [0;1], we choose a particular
Kumaraswamy-type law as follows.
(11) F(c) = 1   (1   c)2; 8c 2 [0;1]:
As in the previous case, we substitute c with its expression in (7) and rewrite E(t;q)
as follows:































 F asymmetric to the right: \high shame" countries.
This is the converse case with respect to the previous one. The number of honest
entrepreneurs is greater than that of the corrupt. Also in this case, we synthesize the
costs with a Kumaraswamy-type law as follows.
(14) F(c) = 1   (1   c2) = c2; 8c 2 [0;1]:
We rewrite E(t;q) in (7) as follows:

























The solutions G's explicitly derived in (10), (13) and (16) will be denoted hereafter with
G(t;q;k) with the subscripts U; L; R, to highlight the explicit dependence with respect to
t, q and k and maintain an explicit reference to the level of corruption of the country.
3 Dynamic Analysis
The game perspective is now expanded to review the consequences of the tax rate on dynamic
revenues and on economic growth. The entrepreneur can use her/his payo 
(1)
i ; i = 1;2,















i   C; i = 1;2:
where C is per capita consumption,  is the discount rate in time, and 
(1)
i is the payo for
the entrepreneur.
7We now substitute the values G(t;q;k)'s in the equilibria with corruption and without
corruption (see Proposition 3.1). Indeed, since the return on the investment for the
entrepreneur is dierent in each of the two equilibria found (with {
(1)
2 { and without
corruption 
(1)
1 ), the problem is solved for the two cases.
By solving the dynamic game, we can prove the following proposition:11
Proposition 3.1. Let 0  c  1 dened as in Proposition 3.1. Then,















(b) if cj > c the growth rate, for the j-th entrepreneur, is
(21) NC




An [G(t;q;k)]k (1   t)   
	
;
where the G's have to be intended with the subscripts U; L; R.
Equilibrium depends, therefore, on the individual \shame cost":
 for a given tax rate t, the entrepreneurs with a \shame cost" of cj  c, will nd it
worthwhile to be corrupt and so their optimal equilibrium will be with corruption. In
such an equilibrium, the j-th entrepreneur will obtain a growth rate of C
j ;
 for a given level of tax rate t, entrepreneurs with a \shame cost" cj > c will nd it
worthwhile to be honest and their optimal equilibrium will be without corruption. In
such an equilibrium, the j-th entrepreneur will obtain a growth rate of NC.
It may be further demonstrated that capital and income also have the same growth rate of
consumption and, therefore, equilibrium without corruption, from the dynamic viewpoint,
is the equilibrium which allows greater economic growth12. In addition, since the tax rate
inuences the accumulation of capital, the provision of the public good and, as a consequence,
economic growth, it will also increase scal revenues at a steady state. We would like to
remind readers that the static tax revenues are (7):
E(t;q) = An Gk1 tF(c)(1   )q + An Gk1 t(1   F(c))(1   ):
In a steady state, the growth rate of tax revenues should also be constant and, therefore,
E(t;q) and k grow at the same rate. Indeed, lower revenues today due to evasion, can bring
11See Appendix C for the proof.
12In fact, at a steady state, everything grows at the same rate and therefore

k
k is constant. At equilibrium












k is constant, then the







R(t;q;k)  k, then C and k should grow at the same rate. Similarly,
since y = a[G
(t;q;k)]
k
1 , at a steady state, income grows at the same rate as capital. The same applies
in the case of equilibrium without corruption.
8greater growth through greater capital accumulation and, consequently, greater revenues
tomorrow.
At the aggregate level, we will have a growth rate obtained by considering the dierent
growth rates for the corresponding entrepreneurs.
Dene  the fraction of honest entrepreneurs. In the equilibrium with corruption there will
be (1   ) entrepreneurs, each with her/his own growth rate C
j , in the equilibrium without
corruption there will be  entrepreneurs, each with the same growth rate NC.
We perform the distinction for the \shame costs" introduced in the previous section.
At the aggregate level, we can prove the following proposition:13
Proposition 3.2. The aggregate growth rate is:



















































We would now like to provide a sensitivity analysis of  with respect to t and q.
We proceed by performing a numerical analysis of the behavior of  with respect to t and q,
since the complexity of the dynamics involved does not allow closed{form results. Hence, a
more intuitive description of the real situation is also provided.
We refer to the cases discussed above, with low, high and middle shame countries. We set
 = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:03,  = 0:5, n = 10, k = 1 and three dierent values for the
technology parameter A = 0:5;1;2.
We can detect four dierent eects in the behavior growth rate both of the income and of
tax revenues with respect to t.
(1) As the tax rate increases, the remaining number of honest individuals pay more taxes
and so accumulate less, depressing growth.
(2) As the tax rate increases, the number of dishonest entrepreneurs increases and,
therefore, growth increases inasmuch as the number of undiscovered corrupt
entrepreneurs increases. The corrupt entrepreneur now pays a bribe and the bribe
is lower than the tax amount s/he would have paid if s/he had remained honest. A
greater amount of resources will be allocated to investment and generate higher growth.
13See Appendix D for the proof.
9(3) As the tax rate increases, the number of dishonest entrepreneurs increases and,
therefore, growth is reduced inasmuch as the number of discovered corrupt
entrepreneurs increases. The newly corrupt entrepreneur, when discovered (as s/he will
be forced to pay taxes but will receive the bribe back), is tantamount to an entrepreneur
whose tax burden has increased.
(4) As the tax rate increases, then the amount of public good G, obtained via balance
constraints, increases as well, and so does the growth rate.
If we take into account the behavior of the growth rate with respect to q, three dierent
remarks can be detected.
(10) As the monitoring level increases, the remaining number of corrupt individuals are
easily detected and pay more taxes. So they accumulate less, depressing growth.
(20) As the monitoring level increases, the number of honest entrepreneurs increases and,
therefore, the tax revenues increase, reducing capital accumulation and consequently
economic growth.
(30) As the monitoring level increases, then G increases. As a consequence, the growth
rate increases.
In order to discuss how the behavior of growth rate changes as a consequence of variations
in the tax rate, we should vary the analysis depending on whether the level of monitoring is
high or low. In particular, the eect of the tax rate on the growth rate is less relevant for
growing values of q, and the growth rate has a very low sensitivity with respect to t when
the monitoring value tends to 1. This is reasonable, since exasperate monitoring activity
removes the dierences between honest and corrupt individuals.
For very high levels of monitoring, the dierences in behavior of the growth rate to changes
of tax rate are very small. Specically, in all three cases - low, middle and high- shame
countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after
which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases. In fact, for low tax rates,
the increase in growth due to (2) and (4) is stronger than the negative eect due to (1) and
(3). Let us explain the meaning of this behavior: when the tax rate grows, the number of
corrupted entrepreneurs detected who pay more taxes increases. Therefore, the provision
of the public good grows and thus economic growth increases. Conversely, when the tax
rate is high, the increase in growth due to (2) and (4) is weaker than the negative eect
due to (1) and (3). In this case, the higher taxes paid by honest and by entrepreneurs who
have been discovered, depress economic growth, via lower capital accumulation. When the
monitoring level is high in all countries, the growth rate behaves analogously, even if, in the
\low shame" countries (see Figure 1), this happens with more sensitivity with respect to the
tax rate variations.
When the monitoring level is low, the behavior of the growth rate is very dierent compared
to when the monitoring level is high. In particular, all countries show that, where a
monitoring level q is xed, the growth rate decreases with respect to the tax rate level,
and this aspect becomes more relevant when t is high. The expansion due to (2) and (4)
is less than the decrease in the growth rate due to (1) and (3). This result is grounded
10on the fact that the tax revenues increase alongside the monitoring level, and a consequent
reduction in economic growth takes place.
The three types of countries considered, however, dier in how the growth rate decreases
with the increase in the tax rate: the rate of decrease is higher in \low shame" countries
than in \high shame" countries. For \high shame" countries (see Figure 2), where a low
monitoring level q is xed, the growth rate decreases very slowly as the tax rate increases
up to a intermediate level: after that level, the growth rate decreases at a increasing rate.
This result can be interpreted as follows: if the population is generally honest, the honest
and entrepreneurs detected in corrupt transactions who pay more taxes, depressing growth
rate, are a limited phenomenon when compared to \low and middle shame" countries.
In particular, in \low shame" countries, the decrease in the growth rate becomes very
pronounced from lower levels of the tax rate. This result derives from the fact that, in
a very corrupt country, as the tax rate increases, the number of entrepreneurs detected in
corruption grows consistently. Therefore, the tax revenues increase, depressing the growth
rate consistently.
The analysis of the behavior of the growth rate with respect to q agrees with previous
results. In particular, when a tax rate is xed, the behavior of the growth rate is very
dierent depending on whether the tax rate is low or high. For a low tax rate level, the
growth rate is roughly constant with the level of the monitoring: the growth rate does not
depend on the monitoring activity. We have an equilibrium situation, where the aggregate
negative eects of (10) and (20) balance the expansion of the growth due to (30) perfectly.
When a high tax rate t is xed, the growth rate increases with respect to the monitoring
activity level. The positive eect (30) is greater than the tendency to depression due to (10)
and (20). We interpret these ndings by noticing that the most important eect of monitoring
activity is to increase the amount of the public goods due to greater tax revenues.
If we rely on technology parameter A we have that, ceteris paribus, when we consider A
higher, the growth rate surface behaviors described above are amplied and the values of the
growth rates are bigger when A is higher, since the growth rate increases when entrepreneurs
invest their resources. The argument of the amplication of the eects due to a greater value
of A applies hereafter, for the entire set of numerical analyses we will perform throughout
the paper. Figures 1 and 2 refer to the case of A = 2.
We now analyze the corner{solutions. In particular, we focus on the extremal values of the
monitoring activity level q and of the tax rate t.
 If t = 0, then there are no tax revenues for the country. The public good derived from
tax revenues is therefore null, economic analysis becomes trivial and quite senseless.
 If t = 1, then the entire amount of each entrepreneur's production goes to the State.
The presence of a monitoring activity level q > q prevents the mass of entrepreneurs
from becoming corrupt: indeed, in this case c =
1 q
q 2 (0;1). A closed{form analysis
is not suitable, and we prefer to proceed numerically, by adopting the same set of
parameters used in the global analysis performed above. Figure 3 shows our ndings
when A = 2. The growth rate increases with respect to q and it is concave in all
situations of corruption within the countries. The positive eect (30) is more incisive
than the negative impact on growth due to (10) and (20). The most relevant eect of


































































































Figure 2: Growth rate in a "high shame"
country
Nevertheless, as the monitoring activity level becomes bigger, an inverse tendency is
observed, and the growth rate of the country stabilizes. We interpret this inversion by
noticing that heavy tax rates and monitoring activities depress capital accumulation
and, consequently, growth.
 If q = 1, then we have c = 0 i.e. the entire population is honest. The eects on the

































If the tax rate is low enough (below the critical threshold t
1), then the positive eect on
growth due to (4) is more relevant than the negative eect due to (1). This behavior
inverts for t greater than t
1. The economic key is grounded on two arguments: for
low tax rates, capital accumulation is high for low tax rates, even when the State
monitors actively. As a consequence, the country's growth increases. Conversely, when














Figure 3: Growth rate when t=1
the monitoring activity is strong and the tax rate is high, then capital accumulation
reduces, and growth reduces as well, even if the amount of public goods increases. We
notice that the tax rate threshold t
1 goes hand in hand with production y, since it is
proportional to the parameter .
 If q = q, then we have c = 1, and the entire population is corrupt. Also in this case,
we prefer to proceed via numerical simulation, to provide a more intuitive analysis.
The usual parameter set is used. Figure 4 shows our ndings for A = 2. The growth
rate decreases with respect to the tax rate t. Since the mass of the population is
corrupt, the negative eect on growth due to (1) vanishes. Therefore, the negative
term (3) is more evident than the positive eects due to (2) and (4). The growing
number of individuals detected as corrupt pay more taxes as t increases, and this
depresses capital accumulation and growth. The growth rate of tax revenues depends
positively on economic growth in the sense that greater growth implies, all the rest
being equal, greater revenues and negatively on corruption in that greater corruption
implies, all the rest being equal, lower revenues. It follows that the policy maker must
put dierent policies into action if s/he wants to maximize the growth rate in a \high
shame" country or in a \low{uniform shame" country: a country with a high sense of
honesty can set a medium-high rate before seeing substantial reductions in their tax
revenues, while if the country has low \inner honesty", the State must x a very low
tax rate in order to avoid a relevant reduction in the amount of tax collected.














Figure 4: Growth rate when q = q
3.1 Bargaining strength
In an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, the surplus is shared unequally between the tax
inspector and the taxpayer, and the equilibrium bribe (bNB) is:









where   "
"+ is the share of the surplus which goes to the tax inspector and  and " the
bargaining strength of the entrepreneur and the tax inspector respectively.
Thus, the bribe paid to the inspector increases as the inspector's bargaining strength











Increasing the bargaining power of the tax inspector increases the bribe which s/he can
obtain. In the model, we also see that corruption does not depend on the distribution of the
surplus between the inspector and the tax evader, but only on the amount of the surplus
. In fact, the number of corrupt entrepreneurs is not dependent on the parameters  and
". On the contrary, such parameters aect any rates of income growth and tax revenue in
that a dierent distribution of power in the area of bargaining aects accumulation by the
entrepreneur and, hence, the growth rate.





[An (1   t)[G(t;q;k)]k    ]
and it is not dependent on the parameters  and ". On the contrary, if cj  c the growth
rate for the j-th entrepreneur is dependent on the parameters  and " in that this is the
equilibrium where the entrepreneur pays the bribe and the value of this bribe depends on 






An [G(t;q;k)]k [1   t + q(t + cj)(   1)]   

:
As a result, the aggregate growth rate will also be aected by the bargaining strength of the
inspector and the evader. We denote it as (). In particular, the aggregate growth rate is
linear with respect to .
We can detect two opposite eects in the behavior growth rate both of the income and of
tax revenues with respect to :
(100) As the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, the entrepreneur must give a
greater share of evasion to corruption, i.e. to the tax inspector. In this case, ceteris
paribus, as the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, a lesser amount of
resources will be allocated to investment and generate lower growth;
(200) As the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, the entrepreneur is able to
transfer a greater part (qcj) of her/his \shame cost" to the tax inspector. In this
case, ceteris paribus, as the bargaining strength of the inspector increases, a greater
amount of resources will be allocated to investment and generate higher growth.
In order to describe the constant rate of decay of (), we introduce the subscripts U; L; R
and proceed numerically adopting the usual parameter set.






























In the three cases, the same ndings are obtained, and Figure 5 shows our results for A = 2.
We see that the growth rate does not increase at all when the monitoring level is high and


























Figure 5: Growth rate()
when either the monitoring level or the tax rate are high. In this case, the aggregate eect
of (100) is weaker than the positive eect due to (200). Therefore, as the bargaining strength
of the inspector increases, the growth rates increases as well.
This result is compatible with the economic evidence that, when the tax rate and the
monitoring activity level are high enough, a proportion of a country's surplus going towards
incentivizing the action of tax inspectors has a positive impact on the country's growth rate.
The size of such a positive impact varies according to the tax rate which has been applied,
the capital productivity, the monitoring level and the marginal utility elasticity. Even if the
presence of a part of surplus for the inspectors subtracts resources from the entrepreneurs'
investments, the larger amount of taxes paid under a stronger monitoring regime allows for
a larger amount of public goods via balance constraints, and this, in turn, permits growth
to become higher.
4 Conclusions
The present paper provides a study of the problem of the optimal tax rate, where there is
corruption. In this paper, we have extended the static analysis of Cerqueti and Coppier
(2009), in a dynamic context, incorporating the presence of a public sector. Like Ellis and
Fender (2006), we introduce endogenous corruption into a variant of the Ramsey growth
model where a government taxes private producers and uses the resources to either supply
public capital. Our model is dierent from theirs, in that we deal with scal rather
bureaucratic corruption. We show, that the relationship between the tax rate and tax
16revenues depends not only on the dynamic or static context, but also on the \inner honesty"of
society. In fact, like Dell'Anno (2009), we analyze a dynamic model, where the aggregate tax
evasion is microfounded on non{pecuniary costs and we prove that the relationship between
the tax rate and tax collection is not unique but is dierent depending on the relevance of
the \shame eect". In a long run analysis, given the basic tenet of our model that evasion on
one hand stimulates investment, accumulation and thereby growth but, on the other hand,
reduces tax revenues and therefore the provision of the public good, the optimal tax rate
depends on \ shame costs". We show that growth rates - both of income and of tax revenues
- decrease, as the tax rate increases, for all types of \shame eect" countries but they dier
in how the growth rate decreases as the tax rate increases: the rate of decrease is higher in
\low shame" countries than in \high shame" countries. It follows that the policy maker must
put dierent policies into action if s/he wants to maximize the growth rate in a \high shame"
country or in a \low{uniform shame" country: a country with a high sense of honesty can
set a medium-high rate before seeing substantial reductions in their tax revenues while, in a
country with low \inner honesty", the State must x a very low tax rate in order to avoid a
relevant reduction in tax revenues. This result is dierent from the U-shaped curve between
growth rate and tax rate shown by Lin and Yang (2001), as they simply consider public
consumer goods and then economic growth can increase as the tax rate increases because
resources are diverted from the unproductive public sector to the productive private sector.
In addition, we nd that a high probability of auditing increases the growth rate; conversely,
Chen (2003) nds that this measure has ambiguous eect on economic growth, due mainly
to its indirect eect upon tax compliance and the tax rate.
17A Appendix: The Nash Bargaining bribe




 ) be the vector of the dierences in the payos between the
case of agreement and disagreement about the bribe, between inspector and entrepreneur.












An Gk1 (t   tq   cjq)   (1   q)b
 [w + (1   q)b   w]
"
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of  and where [An Gk1 (1 
t);w] is the point of disagreement, i.e. the payos that the entrepreneur and the inspector
respectively would obtain if they did not come to an agreement. The parameters  and
" can be interpreted as measures of bargaining strength. It is now easy to check that the
tax inspector gets a share  = "
"+ of the surplus , i.e. the bribe is b = . More
generally  reects the distribution of bargaining strength between two agents. The surplus
 is the saving which comes from not paying taxes, net of \ shame cost", which awaits the







Then the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash bargaining solution and is given
by:








that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, 8q 6= 1.
B Appendix: Solution to the static game
The static game is solved with the backward induction method, which allows identication at
the equilibria. Starting from stage 2, the entrepreneur needs to decide whether to negotiate
with the inspector. Both payos are then compared, because the inspector asked for a bribe.
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18(1) Going up the decision-making tree, at stage one the tax inspector decides whether to
ask for a positive bribe or not.
{ Let t  t dened in (34). Then the tax inspector knows that if s/he asks for a
positive bribe, the entrepreneur will agree to negotiate and the nal bribe will be













If t  t, then the tax inspector asks for a bribe bNB, which the entrepreneur will
accept.
{ Let t < t. Then the tax inspector knows that the entrepreneurs will not accept
any possible bribe, so s/he will be honest and will ask the entrepreneurs for tax
payment.
C Appendix: Solution to the dynamic game
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The Hamiltonian function is:












where  is a constant variable. Optimization provides the following rst-order conditions:
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19In the equilibrium without corruption, the entrepreneur's prot is:
(42) 
(1)
1 = An [G(t;q;k)]k1 (1   t)
Thus the constraint is:
(43)

k = An [G(t;q;k)]k1 (1   t)   C
The Hamiltonian function is:
(44) H = e tC1    1
1   
+ [An [G(t;q;k)]k1 (1   t)   C]





An [G(t;q;k)]k (1   t)   
	
:
D Appendix: Aggregate growth
Aggregate growth  is given by the sum of the rates of obtainable growth considered
by the number of entrepreneurs who are positioned in that equilibrium. Thus, at the
equilibrium with corruption, there will be (1   ) entrepreneurs while at the equilibrium
without corruption, there will be  entrepreneurs.
At the equilibrium without corruption, the growth rate NC in (45) is independent of
reputation costs and will therefore be equal for each entrepreneur with reputation costs
cj > c; at the equilibrium with corruption, the growth rate C
j in (41) is dependent on
reputation costs for which reason each entrepreneur, with a reputation cost of cj  c, will
have a dierent growth rate. Thus


























An [G(t;q;k)]k (1   t)   
	
:
Substituting  = F(c), where F has the three expressions in (8), (11) and (14) into (46)
and after some simplications we obtain the aggregate growth rate in the three cases.
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